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PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW  
Volume 38 Fall 2020 Number 1 
ARTICLES 
The Hallmarks of a Good Test: A Proposal for 
Applying the “Functional Equivalent” Rule 
from County of Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund 
DAMIEN M. SCHIFF* & GLENN E. ROPER† 
The Clean Water Act generally requires a federal permit for the 
discharge of pollutants “from any point source” to navigable waters. 
It is undisputed that permits are required for discharges of pollutants 
from point sources that proceed “directly” to regulated waters. But 
there is much disagreement over the extent to which indirect point-
source discharges are regulated. In an attempt to clarify, the United 
States Supreme Court in County of Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund 
ruled that permits are required not just for direct point-source 
discharges, but also for any point-source discharge that is the 
“functional equivalent” of a direct point-source discharge. 
Unfortunately, the Court did not define the term “functional 
equivalent,” other than to offer a non-exhaustive list of seven factors 
to consider (emphasizing time and distance), and to admonish lower 
courts to both respect the states’ traditional authority over water 
pollution and be mindful of avoiding decisions that would encourage 
evasion of the Act’s permitting requirements. 
To pick up where County of Maui left off, this Article proposes 
the “hallmark” interpretation of the functional equivalent test. 
According to this approach, a pollutant discharge is the “functional 
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equivalent” of a direct discharge (and therefore requires a permit) if 
it bears the hallmarks of a direct discharge—in other words, if the 
discharged pollutants still betray the traces of having been emitted 
from a “discernible, confined and discrete conveyance” (the statutory 
definition of “point source”). In contrast, if the pollutants lack those 
hallmarks, and thus are indistinguishable from pollutants added by 
nonpoint sources, then their discharge is not a regulated “functional 
equivalent.” This “hallmark” approach is consistent not only with 
County of Maui’s articulation of the functional equivalent rule, but 
also with the Court’s expectation of how that rule should be 
implemented. In support of the proposed hallmark analysis, the 
Article defines the reference point (“direct discharge”) and its 
functions, then explains how to determine whether the hallmarks of 
the pollutants at issue are equivalent to the hallmarks of a direct 
discharge. Finally, it cautions that, consistent with County of Maui’s 
admonition, the functional equivalent analysis must include a 
“perspective” check to prevent the Act from being used to undercut the 
states’ traditional authority over water quality, while also respecting 
Congress’ intent that certain point-source discharges be federally 
regulated.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Clean Water Act1 generally forbids the “discharge” of 
“pollutants” into “navigable waters” without a permit.2 
Unfortunately, the scope of the Act’s permit mandate is notoriously 
difficult to ascertain, principally because no one seems quite sure 
what the statute means when it defines “navigable waters” as 
“waters of the United States” (sometimes abbreviated “WOTUS”).3 
 
1.	 	33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1388. 
2.	  See id. §§ 1311(a), 1362(7), (12), (16). We say “generally” because there are 
limited exemptions, chiefly for certain discharges of dredged or fill material. See id. 
§ 1344(f)(1)(A)–(F). 
3.	 	See, e.g., U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs v. Hawkes Co., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1807, 1816 
(2016) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[B]ased on the Government’s representations in 
this case, the reach and systemic consequences of the Clean Water Act remain a 
cause for concern.”); Sackett v. EPA, 566 U.S. 120, 132 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) 
(“The reach of the Clean Water Act is notoriously unclear. Any piece of land that is 
wet at least part of the year is in danger of being classified . . . as wetlands covered 
by the Act . . . .”). The best effort so far, in our view, is Justice Scalia’s plurality 





However, the intensity of the WOTUS wars may give the impression 
that the rest of the statute is easy to apply. The Supreme Court’s 
2019 Term decision in County of Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund4 
belies that view. 
In County of Maui, the Court construed another component of 
the Clean Water Act’s permitting requirement—namely, the 
definition of “discharge of a pollutant” as the addition of pollutants 
“from any point source.”5 The statute defines the term “point source” 
as any “discernible, confined and discrete conveyance,”6 but it does 
not define the phrase “from any point source.” That raises a number 
of questions. Is a pollutant “from” a point source only if it traveled 
directly from the point source to the regulated “water of the United 
States”? If not, then how indirect may the pollutant’s path be and yet 
still be deemed “from” a point source? A few miles’ distance? A few 
days’ time? Through overland sheet flow? Or, how about, as in 
County of Maui, from “a sewage treatment plant [that] discharges 
polluted water into the ground where it mixes with groundwater, 
which, in turn, flows into . . . the ocean”?7 
To help answer that question, the majority in County of Maui 
adopted the “functional equivalent” rule, according to which a point-
source discharge of a pollutant is regulated under the Clean Water 
Act if it either directly emits pollutants into regulated waters, or, if 
not directly, in a manner that is the functional equivalent of such a 
direct discharge.8 But what is a functional equivalent of a direct 
discharge? The Court did not define the term or provide guidance, 
other than to offer a non-exhaustive list of factors that lower courts 
should consider in distinguishing between what is and what is not a 
functional equivalent, while admonishing that a court applying the 
functional equivalent test should be mindful of the states’ traditional 
authority over water pollution as well as the goal of avoiding law 
evasion. 
 
4.	 	County of Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct. 1462 (2020).	
5.	 	33 U.S.C. § 1362(12). 
6.	  Id. § 1362(14). 
7.	 	County	of	Maui,	140	S.	Ct.	at	1468. 
8.  Id. at 1476 (holding that the Clean Water Act “requires a permit when there 
is a direct discharge from a point source into navigable waters or when there is the 






What, then, is the regulated public to do given that the 
functional equivalent rule “does not supply a bright-line test”?9 To 
pick up where the Court left off, we propose in this article the 
“hallmark” interpretation of the functional equivalent test. 
Consistent with this gloss, a pollutant discharge is the functional 
equivalent of a direct discharge (and therefore regulated) if it bears 
the hallmarks of a direct discharge—in other words, if one can 
ascertain that the pollutants still bear the traces of having been 
emitted from a “discernible, confined and discrete conveyance.”10 We 
believe that this approach is consistent not only with the Court’s 
articulation of the functional equivalent rule,11 but also with the 
Court’s expectation of how that rule should be implemented.12 
To provide context for the hallmark analysis’s operation, we 
adhere to the statutory purposes as identified by the Court—
preserving traditional state authority without creating loopholes13—
but with some modification to avoid a latent tension in the Court’s 
articulation of those purposes. For us, the Clean Water Act’s goals 
are best served by outcomes that avoid federalization of groundwater 
pollution and other water-quality problems typically addressed by 
states, while also ensuring that otherwise regulated parties do not 
avoid regulation by merely reconfiguring the mechanics of existing 
discharges. 
Part II provides background on the Clean Water Act, 
emphasizing the importance of the Act’s cooperative federalism 
framework. Part III rehearses the litigation history of attempts to 
construe the “from any point source” requirement. Finally, Part IV 
 
9.	Id. at 1479 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring); accord id. at 1476 (majority opinion) 
(“The difficulty with [the functional equivalent] approach, we recognize, is that it 
does not, on its own, clearly explain how to deal with middle instances.”). 
10.	33 U.S.C. § 1362(14). 
11. See County of Maui, 140 S. Ct. at 1476 (“Whether pollutants that arrive at 
navigable waters after traveling through groundwater are ‘from’ a point source 
depends upon how similar . . . the particular discharge is to a direct discharge.”). 
12.	 See id. at 1477 (“[C]ourts can provide guidance through decisions in 
individual cases. . . . And the traditional common-law method, making decisions that 
provide examples that in turn lead to ever more refined principles, is sometimes 
useful, even in an era of statutes.”). 





sets forth the hallmark analysis, as well as our take on how statutory 
purpose should guide application of the functional equivalent test. 
II. BACKGROUND ON THE CLEAN WATER ACT 
A. Regulation of water quality prior to the Clean Water 
Act 
The first federal regulation of the Nation’s waters consisted 
primarily of laws designed to promote commerce and prohibit 
obstructions to navigation.14 For example, the Rivers and Harbors 
Act of 1890 prohibited the discharge of “waste of any kind into . . . 
navigable waters of the United States which shall tend to impede or 
obstruct navigation,” unless the discharger first obtained “a permit 
from the Secretary of War.”15 A later statute, the Rivers and Harbors 
Act of 1899, prohibited the unpermitted “discharge” of “any refuse 
matter of any kind . . . other than that flowing from streets and 
sewers and passing therefrom in a liquid state, into any navigable 
water of the United States.”16 
Expanding on these early regulatory attempts, the 1948 Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act17 emphasized the important role of 
states in “prevent[ing], control[ling], and abat[ing] water 
pollution.”18 The Pollution Control Act’s “primary mechanism” for 
seeking to control pollution was the use of “water quality standards,” 
which “specif[ied] the acceptable levels of pollution in a State’s 
interstate navigable waters.”19 States were required to set and work 
to achieve quality metrics for the waters within their boundaries. 
However, as the United States Supreme Court later recognized, 
 
14.	See United States v. Pa. Indus. Chem. Corp., 411 U.S. 655, 663–66 (1973) 
(discussing the history of navigable waters regulation); United States v. Republic 
Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482, 485–86 (1960) (similar historical discussion). 
15.	Rivers and Harbors Act of 1890, 26 Stat. 426.  
16.	33 U.S.C. § 407 (originally enacted as Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, ch. 
425, § 13, 30 Stat. 1152). 
17.	Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-845, 62 Stat. 
1155. 
18.	S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 1 (1971), as reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3669 
(discussing the history of water pollution regulation). 







three features of the Pollution Control Act made it ineffective: first, 
it focused solely on effects (i.e., pollution levels) rather than causes 
(i.e., the discharge of pollutants); second, there was “awkwardly 
shared federal and state responsibility for promulgating [water 
quality] standards”; and third, there were “cumbrous enforcement 
procedures.”20 The combination of these features made it “very 
difficult” to enforce the Act or to reduce water pollution.21 
For the next several decades, Congress sought to remedy these 
problems through a series of amendments to the Act. The 
amendments focused on offering federal grants to promote states’ 
and localities’ regulatory efforts, improving cooperation between the 
federal government and the states, and establishing a federal agency 
to administer the program.22 In 1970, Congress further amended the 
Act to address specific water-quality issues, including “oil discharges, 
discharge of hazardous substances, discharge of sewage from vessels, 
. . . [and] acid mine drainage.”23 
Despite these revisions, in evaluating the Pollution Control Act 
and its amendments, the Senate Committee on Public Works 
concluded in 1972 that “the Federal water pollution control program 
. . . has been inadequate in every vital aspect.”24 Among the problems 
cited by the Committee were the country’s “severely polluted” 
navigable waters and the frequent use of “[r]ivers, lakes, and 
streams” for waste disposal rather than for other beneficial uses.25 




22.	S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 2–3. The new agency was originally known as the 
Federal Water Pollution Control Administration. Id. at 2. Over the years, its 
authority was transferred to the Secretary of the Interior, then to the Administrator 
of the Environmental Protection Agency. Id. 
23. Id. at 2–3. 
24. Id. at 7. 
25. Id. This is not to say that state and local governments were indifferent to the 
pollution problems. See Jonathan H. Adler, Fables of the Cuyahoga: Reconstructing 
a History of Environmental Protection, 14 FORDHAM ENV’T L.J. 89, 111 (2002) 
(“Although reliable data on water quality in the 1960s is hard to come by, there is 
reason to believe that state and local efforts produced measurable, if modest, 





chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters is 
essential.”26 In pursuance of that goal, the Committee recommended 
“a major change in the enforcement mechanism of the Federal water 
pollution control program.”27 
B. The 1972 Clean Water Act’s system of effluent 
limitations and cooperative federalism 
Building on the Committee’s efforts, in 1972 Congress adopted 
major Amendments to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act.28 
These Amendments constitute what is commonly known as the 
Clean Water Act, and they “were viewed by Congress as a ‘total 
restructuring’ and ‘complete rewriting’ of the existing water pollution 
legislation.”29 
Mirroring language from the Senate Committee, the primary 
stated objective of the Clean Water Act, found in subpart (a) of the 
first statutory section, “is to restore and maintain the chemical, 
physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”30 But that 
was not Congress’ only concern. Subpart (b) of that same 
introductory section emphasizes the critical—and indeed, primary—
role of states in controlling water pollution: “[i]t is the policy of the 
Congress to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary 
responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate 
pollution [and] to plan the development and use (including 
restoration, preservation, and enhancement) of land and water 
resources.”31 Thus, the 1972 Amendments reaffirmed the need for 
cooperative federalism and renewed a “partnership between the 
States and the Federal Government” with the common goal of 
protecting the nation’s waters.32 
 
26.	S. REP. NO. 92–414, at 7. 
27. Id. 
28.	See Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. 92–
500, 86 Stat. 816. 
29. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 317 (1981) (quoting remarks from 
the legislative history); see also id. at 318 (stating that in enacting the Clean Water 
Act, Congress sought to “establish an all-encompassing program of water pollution 
regulation”). 
30. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (entitled “Congressional declaration of goals and policy”). 
31. Id. § 1251(b). 






Yet there is no doubt that the Clean Water Act constituted a 
major reorientation as to water pollution control. Unlike the 
Pollution Control Act, which focused primarily and directly on water 
quality, the Clean Water Act focused instead on sources of pollution 
by establishing “effluent limitations.”33 Specifically, the Clean Water 
Act proscribed “the discharge of any pollutant by any person,” unless 
done in compliance with new statutory requirements.34 The term 
“pollutant” is broadly defined, to include not only materials such as 
“solid waste,” “sewage,” “garbage,” and “chemical waste,” but also 
naturally occurring, non-toxic substances such as “rock,” “sand,” and 
even “heat.”35 The Clean Water Act was intended to control and limit 
the discharge of any such materials into the country’s waters by 
requiring that it be done only with a permit.36 
The most significant permitting requirement established by the 
Clean Water Act is the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination 
System (NPDES),37 which “requires dischargers to obtain permits 
that place limits on the type and quantity of pollutants that can be 
 
33.	See 33 U.S.C. § 1311; see also id. § 1362(11) (“The term ‘effluent limitation’ 
means any restriction . . . on quantities, rates, and concentrations of chemical, 
physical, biological, and other constituents which are discharged from point sources 
into navigable waters . . . .”). 
34. Id. § 1311(a); see also City of Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at 310–11 (stating that the 
Clean Water Act “established a new system of regulation under which it is illegal for 
anyone to discharge pollutants into the Nation’s waters except pursuantto [sic] a 
permit”). A “person,” for purposes of the Clean Water Act, includes any “individual, 
corporation, partnership, association, State, municipality, commission, or political 
subdivision of a State, or any interstate body.” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(5). 
35. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (“The term ‘pollutant’ means dredged spoil, solid waste, 
incinerator residue, sewage, garbage, sewage sludge, munitions, chemical wastes, 
biological materials, radioactive materials, heat, wrecked or discarded equipment, 
rock, sand, cellar dirt and industrial, municipal, and agricultural waste discharged 
into water.”). The definition excludes certain discharges from military vessels and 
materials injected into oil and gas production wells. Id. 
36.	Permitting authority is shared by the Environmental Protection Agency and 
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. See Permit Program Under CWA Section 404, 
EPA (June 17, 2020), https://www.epa.gov/cwa-404/permit-program-under-cwa-
section-404 [https://perma.cc/8D4P-9NZF]. 
37. 33 U.S.C. § 1342; see also National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System 





released into the Nation’s waters.”38 The NPDES permitting 
program is a good example of the Clean Water Act’s cooperative 
federalism approach, since states and territories can choose to 
administer the permitting program themselves, or leave 
administration to the EPA.39 Most states have elected to operate 
NPDES permitting programs, in whole or in part.40  
C. The point-source/nonpoint-source distinction—a key 
part of the Act’s cooperative federalism framework 
Among the changes implemented in the Clean Water Act was 
the introduction of a new concept in federal water pollution 
regulation: the “point source.” This term appears throughout the Act, 
including in the definition of the term “discharge of a pollutant,” 
which is primarily defined as “any addition of any pollutant to 
navigable waters41 from any point source.”42 Thus, the only pollution 
to which the Act’s permitting requirements apply is pollution that 
 
38. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95, 102 
(2004); see also Decker v. Nw. Env’t Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 602 (2013) (“A central 
provision of the Act is its requirement that individuals, corporations, and 
governments secure National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) 
permits before discharging pollution from any point source into the navigable waters 
of the United States.”); EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Res. Control Bd., 426 
U.S. 200, 205 (1976) (“Under the NPDES, it is unlawful for any person to discharge 
a pollutant without obtaining a permit and complying with its terms.”). 
39. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b). 
40.	See NPDES Program Authorizations, EPA, 
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2020-04/documents/
npdes_authorized_states_2020_map.pdf [https://perma.cc/GV54-ZXTW] (containing 
a map of NPDES programs in states and territories as of July 2019). 
41. The Act defines the term “navigable waters” as “the waters of the United 
States, including the territorial seas.” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7). However, as noted above, 
supra note 3, what constitutes “waters of the United States” (sometimes referred to 
as “jurisdictional waters”) continues to be the subject of intense litigation. See, e.g., 
Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Dep’t of Def., 138 S. Ct. 617 (2018); Rapanos v. United States, 
547 U.S. 715 (2006); Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 
531 U.S. 159 (2001); United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 
(1985); see also Revised Definition of “Waters of the United States”, 84 Fed. Reg. 4154 
(Feb. 14, 2019) (introducing a redefinition of the term “navigable waters”). 
42. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12)(A) (emphasis added). The “discharge of a pollutant” also 
includes “any addition of any pollutant to the waters of the contiguous zone or the 
ocean from any point source other than a vessel or other floating craft.” Id. § 







comes from a point source.43 Somewhat circularly, the Act defines 
“point source” as “any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance 
. . . from which pollutants are or may be discharged.”44 This 
definition is not a model of legislative clarity, and, as we will see, the 
dispute in County of Maui centered on how to interpret and apply 
it.45 
In contrast to point sources, pollution that is not added from a 
“discernible, confined and discrete conveyance” must instead have 
come from a nonpoint source. Although the Act does not specifically 
define that term, it repeatedly uses it.46 Examples of nonpoint source 
pollution include rainwater runoff carrying excess fertilizer from a 
field or oil residue from a highway.47 More broadly, any method of 
transporting pollution to navigable waters that does not qualify as a 
point source is necessarily a nonpoint source.48 There is no third 
option. 
Unlike point source pollution, nonpoint source pollution does not 
require an NPDES permit. In fact, the Act does not directly regulate 
nonpoint-source pollution at all, leaving it instead to the states and 
 
43. E.g., Or. Nat. Desert Ass’n v. Dombeck, 172 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 1998) 
(“Nonpoint source pollution is not regulated directly by the Act, but rather through 
federal grants for state wastewater treatment plans.”). 
44. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14). The definition lists various examples of point sources, 
as well as two exemptions. See id. (“The term ‘point source’ means any discernible, 
confined and discrete conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, 
channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling stock, concentrated 
animal feeding operation, or vessel or other floating craft, from which pollutants are 
or may be discharged. This term does not include agricultural stormwater discharges 
and return flows from irrigated agriculture.”). 
45. See infra Part III. 
46.	See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. §§ 1329, 1255, 1314(f), 1251(a)(7). 
47.	See Basic Information about Nonpoint Source (NPS) Pollution, EPA (Oct. 7, 
2020), https://www.epa.gov/nps/basic-information-about-nonpoint-source-nps-
pollution [https://perma.cc/C8R2-JUU6] (“NPS pollution is caused by rainfall or 
snowmelt, moving over and through the ground. As the runoff moves, it picks up and 
carries natural and human-made pollutants, depositing them into lakes, rivers, 
wetlands, coastal waters and ground waters.”). 
48. Id. (“The term ‘nonpoint source’ is defined to mean any source of water 





their localities.49 Indeed, under 33 U.S.C. § 1329(b), each state is 
required to create its own management program “for controlling 
pollution added from nonpoint sources to the navigable waters 
within the State.”50 This division of responsibility—requiring federal 
permits for point source pollution but leaving regulation of nonpoint 
sources to the states—is a clear manifestation of the cooperative 
federalism framework that underlies the Act. 
III. THE COUNTY OF MAUI LITIGATION 
A. Pre-County of Maui groundwater litigation 
It did not take long for questions—and conflicting court 
opinions—to arise as to the extent to which the Clean Water Act 
provided federal agencies with authority over groundwater. In a 
1975 decision, United States v. GAF Corp., a federal district court in 
Texas held that an NPDES permit was not required for “[t]he 
disposal of chemical wastes into underground waters which have not 
been alleged to flow into or otherwise affect surface waters.”51 That 
was because, the court held, “the regulation of subsurface discharges 
is not within the enforcement purview of the Act.”52 Not long after, 
the Seventh Circuit disagreed with that conclusion, at least where 
the subsurface regulation was connected to “an interim NPDES 
permit program concerning surface discharges.”53 And just one 
month later, the Fifth Circuit issued an opinion conflicting with the 
Seventh Circuit’s, holding that the “navigable waters” limitation in 
the Act meant that the EPA could not regulate deep-well injection of 
wastes, even in connection with its regulation of surface waters.54 
 
49.	 See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 803 (2006) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (asserting that under the Clean Water Act, states are given “nearly 
exclusive responsibility for containing pollution from nonpoint sources”). 
50. 33 U.S.C. § 1329(b)(1). Such management programs are subject to EPA 
approval and may be eligible for federal funding. See id. § 1329(d), (h), (i). 
51. United States v. GAF Corp., 389 F. Supp. 1379, 1383 (S.D. Tex. 1975) 
(footnote omitted). 
52. Id. 
53.	U.S. Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822, 852 (7th Cir. 1977). 






Courts also quickly differed as to whether groundwater is itself 
part of the “waters of the United States,” especially where the 
groundwater is “hydrologically connected” to a regulated surface 
water. For example, a federal district court in Michigan accepted the 
argument that, “while the term ‘navigable waters’ is construed 
broadly, Congress did not intend to include groundwater within its 
definition.”55 The Seventh Circuit similarly concluded that “[n]either 
the Clean Water Act nor the EPA’s definition [of ‘waters of the 
United States’] asserts authority over ground waters, just because 
these may be hydrologically connected with surface waters.”56 Yet 
courts in California57 and Colorado58 held that, although “Congress 
did not intend to require NPDES permits for discharges of pollutants 
to isolated groundwater,” permits might be required if the 
groundwater “has a direct hydrological connection to surface waters 
that themselves constitute ‘waters of the United States.’”59 
Over the ensuing years, courts continued to struggle with 
whether and how to apply the Clean Water Act to groundwater 
pollution.60 The EPA attempted to deal with the question by issuing 
 
55. Kelley ex rel. Michigan v. United States, 618 F. Supp. 1103, 1105 (W.D. Mich. 
1985). 
56. Village of Oconomowoc Lake v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 24 F.3d 962, 965 (7th 
Cir. 1994). 
57.	McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation v. Weinberger, 707 F. Supp. 1182, 
1193–94 (E.D. Cal. 1988), vacated on other grounds sub nom. McClellan Ecological 
Seepage Situation v. Perry, 47 F.3d 325 (9th Cir. 1995); see also N. Cal. River Watch 
v. Mercer Fraser Co., No. C-04-4620, 2005 WL 2122052, at *3, *6 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 
2005). 
58. Sierra Club v. Colo. Refin. Co., 838 F. Supp. 1428, 1434 (D. Colo. 1993) 
(“[T]he Clean Water Act’s preclusion of the discharge of any pollutant into ‘navigable 
waters’ includes such discharge which reaches ‘navigable waters’ through 
groundwater.”). 
59.	McClellan, 707 F. Supp. at 1193–94. 
60. See e.g., United States v. Johnson, 437 F.3d 157, 161 n.4 (1st Cir. 2006) (“The 
[Clean Water Act] does not cover any type of ground water; the [Clean Water Act] 
covers only surface water.”), withdrawn and vacated on other grounds, 467 F.3d 56 
(1st Cir. 2006); Town of Norfolk v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 968 F.2d 1438, 1451 
(1st Cir. 1992) (deferring to the Army Corps’ definition limiting Clean Water Act 
coverage to surface waters); Sierra Club v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 145 F. Supp. 3d 
601, 607 (E.D. Va. 2015) (“Federal courts are split on the issue of whether 





a number of conflicting opinions and permitting decisions over the 
years.61 In any event, by the time the issue was raised in County of 
 
Clean Water Act.”); Tri–Realty Co. v. Ursinus Coll., 124 F. Supp. 3d 418, 459–60 
(E.D. Pa. 2015) (explaining that the “discharge of pollutants into navigable waters 
occurring only through migration of groundwater and uncontrolled soil runoff” is 
nonpoint-source pollution outside the scope of the Clean Water Act’s point source 
program); Cape Fear River Watch, Inc. v. Duke Energy Progress, Inc., 25 F. Supp. 
3d 798, 810 (E.D.N.C. 2014) (“Congress did not intend for the [Clean Water Act] to 
extend federal regulatory authority over groundwater, regardless of whether that 
groundwater is eventually or somehow ‘hydrologically connected’ to navigable 
surface waters.”); Nw. Env’t Def. Ctr. v. Grabhorn, Inc., No. CV-08-548-ST, 2009 WL 
3672895, at *11 (D. Or. Oct. 30, 2009) (“[T]his court concludes that . . . the [Clean 
Water Act] covers discharges to navigable surface waters via hydrologically 
connected groundwater.”); Greater Yellowstone Coal. v. Larson, 641 F. Supp. 2d 
1120, 1138 (D. Idaho 2009) (“[T]here is little dispute that if the ground water is 
hydrologically connected to surface water, it can be subject to [Clean Water Act 
regulation].”); Hernandez v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 599 F. Supp. 2d 175, 181 (D.P.R. 
2009) (“[T]he court holds that the [Clean Water Act] extends federal jurisdiction over 
groundwater that is hydrologically connected to surface waters that are themselves 
waters of the United States.”); Idaho Rural Council v. Bosma, 143 F. Supp. 2d 1169, 
1180 (D. Idaho 2001) (“[T]he court holds that the [Clean Water Act] extends federal 
jurisdiction over groundwater that is hydrologically connected to surface waters that 
are themselves waters of the United States.”); Umatilla Waterquality Protective 
Ass’n, Inc. v. Smith Frozen Foods, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1312, 1320 (D. Or. 1997) 
(“[D]ischarges of pollutants into groundwater are not subject to the [Clean Water 
Act’s] NPDES permit requirement even if that groundwater is hydrologically 
connected to surface water.”); Friends of Santa Fe Cnty. v. LAC Minerals, Inc., 892 
F. Supp. 1333, 1357–58 (D.N.M. 1995) (“[T]he Tenth Circuit’s expansive construction 
of the Clean Water Act's jurisdictional reach[ ] foreclose[s] any argument that the 
[Clean Water Act] does not protect groundwater with some connection to surface 
waters.”); Wash. Wilderness Coal. v. Hecla Mining Co., 870 F. Supp. 983, 989–90 
(E.D. Wash. 1994) (holding that, although “Congress did not intend to include 
isolated groundwater as part of the ‘navigable waters,’” the Act does apply to 
discharges of pollutants that reach surface waters through groundwater). 
61. Compare EPA, FACT SHEET: DRAFT GENERAL PERMITS FOR STORMWATER 
DISCHARGES SYSTEMS FROM SMALL MUNICIPAL SEPARATE SEWER SYSTEMS IN 
MASSACHUSETTS 18 (2014), https://www3.epa.gov/region1/npdes/
stormwater/ma/2014FactSheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z88S-5DYW] (“[D]ischarges to 
groundwater are not addressed in the NPDES program and as such are not 
addressed by this permit.”), and EPA, RESPONSE TO PUBLIC COMMENTS: EPA NPDES 
PESTICIDE GENERAL PERMIT at xxii (2011), (“Generally, discharges to groundwater 
are not regulated under the NPDES program . . . .”), and Memorandum from the 
U.S. EPA Acting Deputy Gen. Couns. to the U.S. EPA Region IX Reg’l Couns. at 2–
3 (Dec. 13, 1973) (“[T]he term ‘discharge of a pollutant’ is defined so as to include only 
discharges into navigable waters (or the contiguous zone or the ocean). Discharges 
into ground waters are not included.”), with Final General NPDES Permit for 
Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations (CAFO) in Idaho ID-G-01-0000, 62 Fed. 






Maui, the question of groundwater pollution was already well-
trodden in the lower courts. 
B. County of Maui district court litigation 
For forty years, the County of Maui, Hawaii, has owned the 
Lahaina Wastewater Reclamation Facility, a wastewater treatment 
plant that disposes of treated sewage into underground injection 
control wells.62 The plant receives and treats about 4 million gallons 
of wastewater per day from the western part of the island of Maui 
and injects the resulting effluent into the injection wells.63 By design, 
the treated wastewater mixes with groundwater, which then seeps 
through the aquifer toward the Pacific Ocean about a half-mile away. 
Although the County obtained various state and federal permits for 
the construction and use of the injection wells, it did not seek or 
receive an NPDES permit for their continued operation. 
In 2011, the EPA ordered a study where tracer dye was added 
into the wells.64 Over time, researchers were able to detect about 
64% of the added dye emerging into the Pacific Ocean from 
underwater springs, taking an average of about 15 months to reach 
 
be affected by the NPDES program is when a discharge of pollutants to surface 
waters can be proven to be via groundwater.”), and EPA, Memorandum from the 
U.S. EPA Dir. and Assoc. Gen. Couns., Office of Solid Waste to the U.S. EPA Waste 
Mgmt. Div. Dirs., Regions I-X at 3 (1995) (“[G]roundwater discharges are subject to 
[Clean Water Act] jurisdiction, based on EPA’s interpretation that discharges from 
point sources through groundwater where there is a direct hydrologic connection to 
nearby surface waters of the United States are subject to the prohibition against 
unpermitted discharges, and thus are subject to the NPDES permitting 
requirements.”), and Bethlehem Steel Corp, 2 E.A.D. 715, 718 (EPA ALJ 1989) 
(stating that EPA “declines to exercise CWA jurisdiction over injection wells (except 
those that inject into ground water with a physically and temporally direct 
hydrologic connection to surface water).”).  
62. See Haw. Wildlife Fund v. County of Maui, 886 F.3d 737, 742 (9th Cir. 2018). 
63. Id. 
64.	See CRAIG R. GLENN ET AL., LAHAINA GROUNDWATER TRACER STUDY at ES-1 
(2013), https://archive.epa.gov/region9/water/archive/web/pdf/lahaina-gw-tracer-
study-final-report-june-2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/J8M4-JHPA] (final report of the 





the ocean.65 The study therefore concluded that a similar portion of 
the County’s treated wastewater must also discharge into the ocean 
from those same underwater springs.66 
In light of that conclusion, a coalition of environmental groups 
sued the County in federal district court under the Clean Water Act’s 
citizen-suit provision67 for discharging treated wastewater without a 
federal NPDES permit.68 The lawsuit claimed that the ocean 
discharge was harming the chemical, physical, and biological 
integrity of the oceanic environment.69 The County disputed that 
assertion, but also argued that an NPDES permit was unnecessary 
because the injection wells do not discharge into a navigable water, 
but into groundwater.70 Furthermore, the County argued that even 
though effluent from the wells reaches the Pacific Ocean (which is 
indisputably a navigable water, at least to the extent of the 
territorial sea),71 it does so only through diffuse subterranean 
groundwater flow, which is nonpoint-source pollution that falls 
outside the scope of the NPDES program.72 
The federal district court in Hawaii granted summary judgment 
for the environmental groups.73 It applied what it called a “conduit 
theory” to hold that the County’s injection wells are point sources 
requiring NPDES permits.74 Under that theory, even though the 
wells did not directly discharge into a navigable water, they are still 
 
65. Id. at ES-3. The dye was first detected in the ocean about 3 months after 
injection, and the study estimated that it would take about four years to fully exit 
the coast. Id. 
66.	Id. (“[I]t is also our conclusion based on these calculations that 64 percent of 
the treated wastewater injected into these wells currently discharges from the 
submarine spring areas.”). 
67. 33 U.S.C. § 1365. 
68.	See Haw. Wildlife Fund v. County of Maui, 24 F. Supp. 3d 980, 986 (D. Haw. 
2014), aff’d, 881 F.3d 754 (9th Cir. 2018), and aff’d, 886 F.3d 737 (9th Cir. 2018), 
vacated and remanded, 140 S. Ct. 1462 (2020). 
69. Id. at 984–85. 
70.	See id. at 985, 998–1000. 
71. See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7)–(8) (“The term ‘territorial seas’ means the belt of the 
seas measured from the line of ordinary low water along that portion of the coast 
which is in direct contact with the open sea and the line marking the seaward limit 
of inland waters, and extending seaward a distance of three miles.”). 
72.	See Haw. Wildlife Fund, 24 F. Supp. 3d at 998–99. 
73. Id. at 1005. 






point sources because the groundwater acted as a “conduit” that 
transported pollution to a navigable water.75 The district court 
asserted that, under the conduit theory, “Plaintiffs may . . . prevail if 
they show that the discharge into the groundwater . . . is functionally 
equivalent to a discharge into the ocean itself.”76 In adopting the 
conduit theory, the district court recognized that, although in its 
view, the theory “makes sense,” it could not “point to controlling 
appellate law or statutory text expressly allowing” the conduit 
theory.77 
C. County of Maui in the Ninth Circuit 
Maui County appealed the district court’s grant of summary 
judgment. The Ninth Circuit’s decision did not directly address the 
district court’s “conduit theory,” but it rejected the lower court’s 
broad conclusion that “liability under the Clean Water Act is 
triggered when pollutants reach navigable water, regardless of how 
they get there.”78 Instead, the Ninth Circuit devised a different 
standard: the “fairly traceable” test.79 Under this test, it held that 
the County was liable under the Clean Water Act for discharging 
pollutants into the Pacific Ocean because “the pollutants are fairly 
traceable from the point source to a navigable water such that the 
discharge is the functional equivalent of a discharge into the 
navigable water” and because the pollutant levels reaching the 
navigable water were “more than de minimis.”80 
In adopting its test, the Ninth Circuit rejected a different 
standard that had been proposed by the EPA as amicus.81 Under the 
EPA’s proposed approach, “discharges moving through groundwater 
 
75. Id. at 995–96. 
76.	Id. at 994. 
77.	Id. at 996. 
78. Haw. Wildlife Fund v. County of Maui, 886 F.3d 737, 749 (9th Cir. 2018), 
vacated and remanded, 140 S. Ct. 1462 (2020) (quoting Haw. Wildlife Fund, 24 F. 
Supp. 3d at 1000). 
79.	Id. at 749. 
80. Id. 





to a jurisdictional surface water are subject to CWA permitting 
requirements if there is a ‘direct hydrological connection’ between 
the groundwater and the surface water.”82 The Ninth Circuit 
criticized the EPA’s proposed test for “read[ing] two words into the 
CWA (‘direct’ and ‘hydrological’) that are not there” and opined that 
the Ninth Circuit rule “better aligns with the statutory text.”83 
D. The Kinder Morgan and Kentucky Waterways Alliance 
decisions 
Shortly after the Ninth Circuit issued its decision in County of 
Maui, two other Circuit Courts addressed the same issue—namely, 
whether the discharge of pollution into groundwater that travels to 
a navigable water requires an NPDES permit.84 
The Fourth Circuit agreed in Upstate Forever v. Kinder Morgan 
Energy Partners that an NPDES permit may be required for the 
discharge of pollutants into groundwater that passes through to a 
navigable water.85 In Kinder Morgan, several hundred thousand 
gallons of gasoline had spilled from a rupture in an underground 
pipeline in South Carolina.86 Although the pipeline owner swiftly 
repaired the breach, the spilled gasoline continued to seep into 
nearby wetlands and waterways.87 The Fourth Circuit agreed with 
the Ninth Circuit that a discharge need not be directly into navigable 
waters to fall under the Clean Water Act, but rather than follow the 
Ninth Circuit’s traceability rule, the Fourth Circuit adopted the 
 
82.	Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-
Appellees at 12, Haw. Wildlife Fund v. County of Maui, 881 F.3d 754 (9th Cir. 2018) 
(No. 15-17447). 
83. Haw. Wildlife Fund, 886 F.3d at 749 n.3. Of course, as was pointed out in 
the County’s appeal from the Ninth Circuit decision, the terms “fairly traceable” and 
“de minimis” from the Ninth Circuit’s test are also not found in the Clean Water Act. 
Brief for Petitioner at 15–16, 31, County of Maui v. Haw. Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct. 
1462 (2020) (No. 18-260). 
84. See Upstate Forever v. Kinder Morgan Energy Partners, L.P., 887 F.3d 637, 
651 (4th Cir. 2018), vacated and remanded, 140 S. Ct. 2736 (2020); Ky. Waterways 
All. v. Ky. Util. Co., 905 F.3d 925, 934 (6th Cir. 2018). 
85. See Upstate Forever, 887 F.3d at 641–42, 651–52. 
86. Id. at 641. 






EPA’s position.88 That is, the Fourth Circuit held that a plaintiff 
must allege and prove that there is a “direct hydrological connection 
between ground water and navigable waters . . . for a discharge of a 
pollutant that passes through ground water.”89 
In contrast to the other two circuits, the Sixth Circuit in 
Kentucky Waterways Alliance v. Kentucky Utilities Co. held that an 
NPDES permit is not required for discharges into groundwater.90 In 
Kentucky Waterways Alliance, chemicals leaching from coal ash 
ponds were alleged to have contaminated groundwater, which in 
turn contaminated a nearby lake.91 The plaintiffs asserted that 
under the “hydrological connection” theory, the owner of the ponds 
should be liable under the Clean Water Act.92 The Sixth Circuit, 
however, rejected the theory, holding that “[t]he text and statutory 
context of the CWA make [it] clear” that it “does not extend its reach 
to this form of pollution.”93 In so deciding, the court expressly 
disagreed with the decisions in Upstate Forever and Hawaii Wildlife 
Fund.94 
E. County of Maui in the Supreme Court 
Given the acknowledged circuit split on the question of Clean 
Water Act jurisdiction over discharges into groundwater, the 
 
88. Id. at 649–51 & n.12 (noting, however, that the Fourth Circuit panel saw “no 
functional difference” between the Ninth Circuit’s rule and the EPA’s “direct 
hydrological connection” position). 
89.	Id. at 651. 
90. 905 F.3d 925, 940 (6th Cir. 2018). 
91. Id. at 928. 
92. Id. at 932–33. The court stated in a footnote that “[t]his theory has also been 
referred to as the ‘conduit’ theory,” id. at 932 n.5 (citing Damien Schiff, Keeping the 
Clean Water Act Cooperatively Federal – Or, Why the Clean Water Act Does Not 
Directly Regulate Groundwater Pollution, 42 WM. & MARY ENV’T. L. & POL’Y REV. 447, 
467–68 (2018)), although there is at least a conceptual difference between whether 
there is a “conduit” to a navigable water and whether there is a “direct hydrological 
connection” with such water. 






Supreme Court unsurprisingly granted certiorari to review the 
Ninth Circuit’s decision.95 
1. Positions in the parties’ briefs 
The Supreme Court had plenty of options to choose from in 
deciding on the appropriate test to apply to discharges into 
groundwater. In addition to the decisions of the circuit courts, the 
parties, plus the United States as amicus curiae, suggested three 
different ways to read the language of the CWA.  
First, the County argued for a “bright-line test” focused on the 
“means of delivery” of the pollutant.96 Under the County’s position, 
an NPDES permit “is necessary only where pollutants are being 
delivered to navigable waters by a point source or series of point 
sources.”97 In contrast, “[a] point source permit is not required if 
pollutants are instead being delivered to navigable waters by 
nonpoint sources, such as runoff or groundwater.”98 Thus, under the 
County’s “bright-line test,” if there is a nonpoint source between the 
discharge from a point source and the navigable water, no permit is 
required. 
Second, the United States, as amicus, argued for a slightly 
different interpretation.99 The United States’ position was based on 
 
95. See Haw. Wildlife Fund v. County of Maui, 886 F.3d 737 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. 
granted, 139 S. Ct. 1164 (Feb. 19, 2019) (No. 18–260). In addition to the question of 
whether the Clean Water Act applies “when pollutants originate from a point source 
but are conveyed to navigable waters by a nonpoint source, such as groundwater,” 
Maui County had sought certiorari on a second question, which the Supreme Court 
did not grant. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Haw. Wildlife Fund, 866 F.3d 737 
(No. 18-260) (“Whether the County of Maui had fair notice that a CWA permit was 
required for its underground injection control wells that operated without such a 
permit for nearly 40 years.”). The defendant in Kinder Morgan also sought certiorari 
of the Fourth Circuit decision, and the Supreme Court held the petition pending a 
decision in County of Maui, after which it granted certiorari, vacated the Fourth 
Circuit decision, and remanded for further consideration. See Kinder Morgan Energy 
Partners, L.P. v. Upstate Forever, 887 F.3d 637, cert. granted, judgement vacated 
and remanded, 140 S. Ct. 2736, (2020) (mem.). 
96.	Brief for Petitioner at 27–28, County of Maui v. Haw. Wildlife Fund, 140 S. 
Ct. 1462 (2020) (No. 18-260). 
97. Id. at 27. 
98.	Id. at 28.  
99.	See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, 






an “Interpretive Statement” issued by the EPA after the Supreme 
Court granted certiorari, but before merits briefing began.100 After 
reviewing more than 50,000 comments, prior court decisions, the 
legislative history, and the EPA’s prior approach to the question, the 
agency issued an Interpretive Statement adopting what might be 
called a “groundwater is different” approach.101 Under this 
approach, “the best, if not the only, reading of the statute is that all 
releases to groundwater are excluded from the scope of the NPDES 
program, even where pollutants are conveyed to jurisdictional 
surface waters via groundwater.”102 There are two alternative 
rationales that underlie this approach to treating groundwater 
differently: “[t]he interposition of groundwater between a point 
source and the navigable water . . . may be said to break the causal 
chain between the two, or alternatively may be described as an 
intervening cause.”103 Under either view of causality, a discharge 
into groundwater does not require an NPDES permit. However, 
unlike the County’s bright-line test, the United States’ position was 
categorically limited to discharges into groundwater. It argued that 
the Court “need not decide whether and how the Act would apply 
when pollutants travel from a point source to jurisdictional surface 
waters through a medium other than groundwater,” a situation for 
which the Interpretive Statement reaffirmed a “case-by-case 
approach to determining . . . [w]hether a permit is required.”104  
Third, the environmental group plaintiffs basically agreed with 
the Ninth Circuit that an NPDES permit is required if a pollutant 
reaching navigable water is “fairly traceable” back to a point 
source.105 Perhaps recognizing the breadth of that argument, the 
 
100.	Interpretive Statement on Application of the Clean Water Act National 
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Program to Releases of Pollutants From a 
Point Source to Groundwater, 84 Fed. Reg. 16,810 (Apr. 23, 2019) (to be codified at 
40 C.F.R. pt. 122). 
101. Id. at 16,810. 
102.	Id. at 16,814. 
103. Id.  
104. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 33–
34, County of Maui, 140 S. Ct. 1462 (No. 18-260) (quoting 84 Fed. Reg. at 16,814). 





plaintiffs suggested a slight modification of the Ninth Circuit test—
a requirement that “the point-source release be a proximate cause of 
the addition of pollutants to navigable waters.”106 In other words, 
“the pollution of navigable waters must be a ‘foresee[able]’ or ‘natural 
and probable’ consequence of the point-source discharge.”107 
2. Oral argument 
Oral argument was held on November 6, 2019.108 In his opening 
remarks, counsel for the County made three main points. First, the 
issue is not whether Maui County’s disposal of wastewater should be 
regulated, but how. That is, “several existing state and federal 
environmental programs, including the Clean Water Act’s nonpoint 
source program,” already regulate the County’s injection wells; the 
question is whether they are also subject to point source 
regulation.109 Second, with regard to text, the County focused on the 
Act’s definition of “point source” as a “conveyance,”110 arguing that 
the key question “is not where a pollutant comes from but how it 
reaches navigable waters.”111 If it is delivered by a point source, then 
a permit is required; otherwise, it is not. Third, the County 
emphasized the importance of predictability. Given the strict 
penalties for noncompliance, regulated parties should be able to 
know in advance whether to seek a permit.112 
 
106. Id.; see also id. (“The [Clean Water Act’s] textual requirement that 
pollutants come ‘from’ a point source also implicates ‘[t]he legal concept of “proximate 
cause,’” a ‘shorthand for the policy-based judgment that not all factual causes 
contributing to an injury should be legally cognizable causes.’”) (second alteration in 
original) (quoting U.S. Br. at 23). 
107. Id. at 20–21 (alteration in original) (quoting Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. 
v. Kellogg, 94 U.S. 469, 475 (1876)). 
108.	Transcript of Oral Argument at 1, County of Maui v. Haw. Wildlife Fund, 
140 S. Ct. 1462 (2020) (No. 18-260). 
109. Id. at 3. 
110.	33 U.S.C. § 1362(14). 
111.	Transcript of Oral Argument at 3–4, County of Maui, 140 S. Ct. 1462 (No. 
18-260). 
112. Id. at 4. Justice Kavanaugh picked up on this last point when questioning 
counsel for the plaintiffs, highlighting the need for “some clear line for the property 
owner” and for a standard “that’s objectively clear on the front end,” not only “after 
a lot of litigation.” Id. at 59–60. His concurring opinion, however, did not press the 






The Justices’ questions to the County centered on its bright-line 
position. For example, the Chief Justice began by asking whether 
“any intervention of groundwater [between a point source and a 
navigable water] removes the jurisdiction of the point source 
program?”113 The County agreed that it would. This concerned 
Justice Breyer, who worried that the County’s position would provide 
“an absolute road map for people who want to avoid . . . point source 
regulation.”114 That is, a polluter could just end its pipe or other 
source of pollution “five feet from” the navigable water to avoid point 
source regulation.115 Instead, Justice Breyer stated that he was 
looking for “a standard that would prevent evasion.”116 Justice 
Kagan also took issue with the County’s reading of the statute, 
arguing that the textual analysis is simple: “here [the pollution is] 
from a point source, which is the well, and it’s to navigable waters, 
which is the ocean, and it’s an addition. How does this statute not 
apply?”117 The County’s response was that the word “from” “takes its 
meaning from the words that are around it,” including the terms 
“conveyance” and “addition,” which require something more than 
mere traceability.118 
The United States also participated in the argument, as amicus. 
It reiterated the “groundwater is different” approach from its 
Interpretive Statement, arguing that Congress intended that 
groundwater breaks the causal chain such that a permit is not 
required for discharges into groundwater.119 The Chief Justice again 
asked whether “any little bit of groundwater” is sufficient, even “two 
inches.”120 The United States agreed that would be enough, but 
 
113. Transcript of Oral Argument at 5–6, County of Maui, 140 S. Ct. 1462 (No. 
18-260) (emphasis added). 
114. Id. at 9. 
115.	Id.; see also id. at 11 (“JUSTICE KAGAN: . . . [N]obody would ever have to 
go through that process of getting a permit if they knew that they could do something 
like what Justice Breyer was suggesting, just stop the pipe five feet before the 
ocean.”). 
116. Id. at 9. 
117. Id. at 14 (emphases added). 
118. Id. at 14–16. 
119. Id. at 24. 





highlighted that in the United States’ view (in contrast to the 
County’s), a permit would be required if the pollutant travels over 
land instead of through groundwater.121 Justice Breyer suggested 
that, in his view, an alternative approach would be to require permits 
if a discharge into groundwater is “the functional equivalent of a 
direct discharge.”122 That approach, he asserted, would be “narrower 
than the Ninth Circuit” but would “leave[] a lot of room for the EPA 
to write regulations, to decide what is the functional equivalent of a 
direct discharge.”123 The United States’ attorney expressed some 
skepticism, but ultimately stated that “if [the EPA] had rule-making 
authority and could . . . flesh that out, it would be helpful.”124 
Finally, counsel for the environmental group plaintiffs focused 
his initial remarks on the fact that the Clean Water Act is not limited 
to “direct” discharges, but broadly prohibits all additions of 
pollutants to navigable waters from any point source.125 As to the 
meaning of the word “from” in the statute, plaintiffs’ counsel used 
the example of groceries to illuminate his argument: “When you buy 
groceries, you say they came from the store, not from your car, even 
though that’s the last place they were before they entered your 
house.”126 Plaintiffs’ counsel also explained that the EPA had 
interpreted the Clean Water Act consistent with this view for 30 
years without the “parade of horribles” that the County argued for, 
and he noted the potential under the County’s argument for evasion 
by large-scale polluters.127  
The Chief Justice was the first to ask questions again, focusing 
on concerns with the two purported limiting principles of the 
plaintiffs’ argument: traceability and proximate cause.128 The Chief 
Justice took issue with both, calling traceability a “technological 
issue” that depends on “how sophisticated the instruments are that 
 
121. See id. at 24–26. 
122. Id. at 31. That was the approach ultimately adopted by a majority of the 
Court, in an opinion by Justice Breyer. See infra Part III.E.4. 
123.	Transcript of Oral Argument at 31, County of Maui, 140 S. Ct. 1462 (No. 
18-260).  
124. Id. at 32. 
125. Id. at 33. 
126.	Id. 
127. Id. at 33–35. 






can trace it” and stating that proximate cause is a “notoriously 
manipulable” standard.129 Justice Alito also chimed in, using an 
example that featured prominently in the briefs—that of septic 
tanks.130 He asked whether an “ordinary family out in the country” 
that buys a septic tank would be liable under the Clean Water Act if 
the septic tank were to leach pollutants that make their way into 
navigable waters.131 The plaintiffs’ response was that a properly 
installed septic tank would not discharge pollution at all, but that 
under a traceability standard, “usually, when you have one septic 
tank, you have more, and so just because you find pollutants in the 
water doesn’t mean you know which one it’s from.”132 
Justice Breyer echoed concern about the traceability test and 
again suggested a “functional equivalent” test, fleshed out by EPA 
regulation.133 Counsel for the plaintiffs agreed that his side could 
embrace that test.134 But the Chief Justice questioned whether the 
“functional equivalent” test would provide a workable standard.135 
He criticized it as just “as vague as fairly traceable”—and little 
different in practice: “it seems to me that your answer to me is that 
the functional equivalent is anything that gets to a jurisdictional 
water.”136 
 
129. Id. at 36. Later in the argument, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kagan 
had a fascinating extended back-and-forth about how the proximate cause standard 
works and whether it could be appropriate in this context. See id. at 52–55. 
130. Id. at 40. 
131. Id. 
132. Id. at 44. But see id. at 53 (“CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: . . . So all you 
have to do is get a bunch of neighbors and all put the septic tanks in, and then you’re 
scot free?”). 
133. Id. at 45. 
134. Id. at 47–48. 
135. See id. at 48 (“I don’t mean to be critical of the author of the phrase, but 
what does ‘functional equivalent’ mean?”); see also id. (“CHIEF JUSTICE 
ROBERTS: Well, what’s the functional equivalent of a pipe when you’re talking 
about groundwater?”). Note, however, that Chief Justice Roberts ultimately joined 
the majority opinion adopting a “functional equivalent” standard. See infra Part 
III.E.4. 






Based on the comments and questions at oral argument, the 
Court appeared to be fairly evenly divided, with no clear preferred 
standard. 
3. The majority’s rejection of the parties’ arguments 
The Supreme Court decided the case on April 23, 2020.137 The 
Justices issued four separate opinions, with Justice Breyer writing 
for a six-Justice majority.138 His opinion took a purposive 
approach,139 primarily seeking an interpretation of the Clean Water 
Act that would support Congress’ objective of “restor[ing] and 
maintain[ing] the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the 
Nation’s waters.”140 Accordingly, the majority opinion sought to 
devise a standard that would make it hard for polluters to avoid 
permitting requirements.141  
The majority emphasized that the key textual dispute in the 
case was as to the meaning of the word “from.”142 As noted above, the 
Clean Water Act prohibits the unpermitted discharge of pollutants 
to navigable waters “from” a point source.143 Yet, how close of a 
 
137. County of Maui v. Haw. Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct. 1462 (2020).  
138.	Id. (Justice Breyer’s opinion was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and by 
Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, Kagan, and Kavanaugh). 
139. See, e.g., John F. Manning, The New Purposivism, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 113, 
120 (2011) (“[T]he traditional version of purposivism holds that judges must 
implement, as accurately as possible, the directives that Congress embeds in 
statutes.”); John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 
COLUM. L. REV. 70, 87 (2006) (“[P]urposivism is characterized by the conviction that 
judges should interpret a statute in a way that carries out its reasonably apparent 
purpose and fulfills its background justification . . . .”); see generally Anita S. 
Krishnakumar, Backdoor Purposivism, 69 DUKE L.J. 1275 (2020) (studying 
purposive approaches in the Roberts Court). 
140.	33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (cited in County of Maui, 140 S. Ct. at 1468). 
141.	See, e.g., County of Maui, 140 S. Ct. at 1474 (rejecting the EPA’s reading 
because it “would open a loophole allowing easy evasion of the statutory provision’s 
basic purposes”); id. at 1473 (“We do not see how Congress could have intended to 
create such a large and obvious loophole in one of the key regulatory innovations of 
the Clean Water Act.”); id. at 1477 (“Decisions [regarding Clean Water Act 
applicability] should not create serious risks . . . of creating loopholes that undermine 
the statute’s basic federal regulatory objectives.”). 
142. Id. at 1470 (“The linguistic question here concerns the statutory word 
‘from.’”). 






connection does there need to be between the point source and the 
navigable water? Justice Breyer’s opinion recognizes that the answer 
is not obvious because the word “from” is context-dependent.144 For 
example, if someone asks, “Where have you come from?”, it usually 
would not be appropriate to answer with the name of the country in 
which you were born.145 (Of course, in some contexts—e.g., 
immigration—that might be the proper answer.)  
In deciding how to interpret whether a pollutant is “from” a 
point source, the majority rejected all three tests put forward by the 
parties. It concluded that both the County’s test (“means of delivery”) 
and the United States’ test (“groundwater is different”) were too 
narrow.146 Echoing concerns expressed by several of the Justices at 
oral argument,147 Justice Breyer wrote that those tests would be too 
easy to circumvent; for example, a polluter may try shifting a pipe 
back a few yards from a navigable water so that pollutants released 
by the pipe travel first through groundwater, then enter the 
navigable water.148 Because that would create a “large and obvious 
loophole,” the majority concluded that Congress could not have 
intended an interpretation that would allow such circumvention.149 
The majority afforded little weight to the Interpretive Statement 
promulgated by the EPA.150 It emphasized that the government had 
not asked for Chevron deference to the Interpretive Statement,151 
 
144.	County of Maui, 140 S. Ct. at 1470. 
145.	 Id. (“The word ‘from’ is broad in scope, but context often imposes 
limitations.”). 
146. Id. at 1473–74. 
147. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 8–9, 11, 25–26, County of Maui, 
140 S. Ct. 1462 (No. 18-260). 
148. County of Maui, 140 S. Ct. at 1473 (“If [the County’s position] is the correct 
interpretation of the statute, then why could not the pipe’s owner, seeking to avoid 
the permit requirement, simply move the pipe back, perhaps only a few yards, so 
that the pollution must travel through at least some groundwater before reaching 
the sea?”). 
149. Id.  
150. Id. at 1474. 
151. Id.; see also Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837, 844 (1984). The majority did not address the question of whether the 





and even though the Court often “pay[s] particular attention to an 
agency’s views,” because the EPA’s reading would open up the same 
“loophole” as the County’s position, the majority concluded that its 
interpretation “is neither persuasive nor reasonable.”152  
As for the traceability test advocated by the plaintiffs and 
adopted by the Ninth Circuit, the majority held that it is too broad 
because virtually all water eventually makes its way to navigable 
water.153 Therefore, given scientific advances, a traceability 
standard might require permits for pollutants that take “many 
years” to reach navigable water and arrive in “highly diluted 
forms.”154 In addition to the breadth of the Ninth Circuit standard, 
the majority listed three other reasons for rejecting it. First, the 
structure of the Clean Water Act shows that Congress intended to 
leave responsibility for groundwater pollution and nonpoint source 
pollution to the individual states.155 The majority emphasized that 
“the States have developed methods of regulating nonpoint source 
pollution through water quality standards, and otherwise.”156 A 
traceability test would impinge on the states’ sphere of authority. 
Second, the majority concluded that the legislative history (for “those 
who look to legislative history to help interpret a statute”) 
contradicts the Ninth Circuit’s broad test, given that Congress has 
rejected several proposals to give the EPA permitting authority over 
groundwater.157 Third, the Court concluded that “longstanding 
regulatory practice” repudiates the traceability test.158 That is, 
 
lower courts are divided. See James Durling & E. Garrett West, May Chevron Be 
Waived?, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 183, 185–87 (2019). 
152. County of Maui, 140 S. Ct. at 1474. 
153. Id. at 1470–71 (“Our view is that Congress did not intend the point source-
permitting requirement to provide EPA with such broad authority as the Ninth 
Circuit’s narrow focus on traceability would allow.”). 
154. Id. at 1470; see also id. at 1471 (concluding that a traceability test could 
require NPDES permits in “surprising, even bizarre, circumstances, such as for 
pollutants carried to navigable waters on a bird’s feathers, or . . . the 100-year 
migration of pollutants through 250 miles of groundwater to a river.”). 
155.	Id. at 1471. 
156.	Id. 
157. Id. at 1471–72 (“Congress was fully aware of the need to address 
groundwater pollution, but . . . left general groundwater regulatory authority to the 
States; its failure to include groundwater in the general EPA permitting provision 
was deliberate.”). 






although the EPA “for many years has applied the permitting 
provision to pollution discharges from point sources that reached 
navigable waters only after traveling through groundwater,” it “has 
opposed applying the Act’s permitting requirements to discharges 
that reach groundwater only after lengthy periods.”159 A traceability 
test would contravene that approach. 
The majority further concluded that the plaintiffs’ proposed 
“proximate cause” limitation to the Ninth Circuit’s test could not 
salvage it. That limitation is inappropriate, the majority concluded, 
because it is not found in the text of the Clean Water Act and is 
instead derived from tort law and based primarily on policy 
considerations.160 Furthermore, “[i]n the context of water pollution, 
we do not see how it significantly narrows the statute” beyond the 
Ninth Circuit test.161 
4. The majority’s “functional equivalent” test 
Rejecting the parties’ positions as either too broad or too narrow, 
the majority sought a middle ground for indirect discharges into 
navigable waters. It settled on the following standard: “[T]he statute 
requires a permit . . . when [the discharge into groundwater] is the 
functional equivalent of a direct discharge.”162 The phrase 
“functional equivalent,” the majority concluded, “best captures, in 
broad terms, those circumstances in which Congress intended to 
 
159. Id. 
160.	Id. at 1470–71. 
161.	Id. at 1471. 
162.	Id. at 1476. The Court did not derive this term out of whole cloth. Both the 
district court and the Ninth Circuit had referenced “functional equivalence” in their 
rulings. Haw. Wildlife Fund v. County of Maui, 24 F. Supp. 3d 980, 994 (D. Haw. 
2014) (“Under this court’s reading of the Clean Water Act and the court’s 
extrapolation from appellate law, Plaintiffs may also prevail if they show that the 
discharge into the groundwater below the LWRF is functionally equivalent to a 
discharge into the ocean itself.”); Haw. Wildlife Fund v. County of Maui, 886 F.3d 
737, 749 (9th Cir. 2018) (“We hold the County liable under the CWA because . . . the 
pollutants are fairly traceable from the point source to a navigable water such that 






require a federal permit.”163 Put another way, where a discharge 
does not “directly deposit[] pollutants into navigable waters,” an 
NPDES permit is nonetheless required if “the discharge reaches the 
same result through roughly similar means.”164 
Recognizing that the phrase “functional equivalent” (like the 
phrase “roughly similar”) is not self-explanatory, the majority 
returned to purposive language: “The object in a given scenario will 
be to advance, in a manner consistent with the statute’s language, 
the statutory purposes that Congress sought to achieve.”165 The 
majority recognized that these “purposes” necessarily include the 
Congressionally mandated role of states in regulating groundwater 
and nonpoint source pollution: “Th[e] context includes the need, 
reflected in the statute, to preserve state regulation of groundwater 
and other nonpoint sources of pollution.”166 
After announcing the “functional equivalent” standard, the 
majority explained that its application will be sufficiently clear at the 
extremes. That is, the permitting requirement “clearly” applies to a 
pipe that emits pollutants that travel only “a few feet” to a navigable 
water.167 In contrast, permitting requirements “likely do not apply” 
where “the pipe ends 50 miles from navigable waters and the pipe 
emits pollutants that travel with groundwater, mix with much other 
material, and end up in navigable waters only many years later.”168 
But what about the more common scenario, where a discharge into 
groundwater occurs somewhere between “a few feet” and “50 miles” 
from a navigable water? The majority recognized that its approach 
“does not . . . clearly explain how to deal with middle instances.”169 
However, the majority felt that it could not announce a more precise 
standard, since “there are too many potentially relevant factors 
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164. Id.; see also id. (“Whether pollutants that arrive at navigable waters after 
traveling through groundwater are ‘from’ a point source depends upon how similar 











applicable to factually different cases for [the] Court now to use more 
specific language.”170 
5. The majority’s list of non-exclusive factors 
Nonetheless, in an attempt to flesh out the “functional 
equivalent” test, the majority identified factors that could be taken 
into account in evaluating whether a permit is required for a 
discharge into groundwater that travels to a navigable water. It 
listed seven non-exclusive factors that “may prove relevant 
(depending upon the circumstances of a particular case).”171 These 
include, for a given pollutant discharge:  
1) transit time,  
2) distance traveled,  
3) the nature of the material through which the 
pollutant travels,  
4) the extent to which the pollutant is diluted or 
chemically changed as it travels,  
5) the amount of pollutant entering the naviga-
ble waters relative to the amount of the pol-
lutant that leaves the point source,  
6) the manner by or area in which the pollutant 
enters the navigable waters, [and] 
7) the degree to which the pollution (at that 
point) has maintained its specific identity.172 
According to the majority, the first two factors—time and 
distance—will usually be the two most important factors, “but not 
necessarily [in] every case.”173 Beyond that, the majority did not 
explain how courts are to balance or apply any of the factors. Just as 
significantly, the majority did not explain how persons subject to the 
Clean Water Act are to evaluate or weigh the factors in deciding 
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whether to seek a permit. Instead, the majority referred again to the 
purposes of the Clean Water Act, stating that permit decisions 
“should not create serious risks either of undermining state 
regulation of groundwater or of creating loopholes that undermine 
the statute’s basic federal regulatory objectives.”174 But after looking 
at these factors, just how is a landowner—let alone a court—to decide 
whether the permit requirement applies in a given case? 
In an attempt to provide at least a partial answer, Justice 
Breyer noted two other potential sources of guidance. First, courts 
can provide common-law direction through decisions in specific 
cases.175 In his view, such judicial decisions may “lead to ever more 
refined principles” of application of the Clean Water Act.176 Second, 
the EPA can provide “administrative guidance” through making 
permitting decisions and promulgating rules.177 In the majority’s 
view, court decisions and administrative guidance will help explain, 
over time, how the test is to apply.  
6. Justice Kavanaugh’s concurrence 
Justice Kavanaugh joined the majority in full but filed a 
concurring opinion to emphasize three things. First, in his view the 
majority’s interpretation is consistent with Justice Scalia’s plurality 
opinion in the 2006 case Rapanos v. United States.178 In Rapanos, 
Justice Scalia wrote for a four-Justice plurality that one cannot 
“evade the permitting requirement of [the Clean Water Act] simply 
by discharging . . . pollutants into noncovered intermittent 
watercourses that lie upstream of covered waters.”179 That is 
because the Clean Water Act “does not forbid the ‘addition of any 
pollutant directly to navigable waters from any point source,’ but 
 




178. Id. at 1478 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (citing Rapanos v. United States, 
547 U.S. 715 (2006)) (“[U]nder Justice Scalia’s interpretation in Rapanos, the fact 
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rather the ‘addition of any pollutant to navigable waters.’”180 In 
Justice Kavanaugh’s view, the Rapanos plurality opinion already 
established that “the fact that the pollutants from Maui’s wastewater 
facility reach the ocean via an indirect route does not itself exempt 
Maui’s facility from the Clean Water Act’s permitting requirement 
for point sources.”181 The County of Maui majority were simply 
following that precedent. 
Second, Justice Kavanaugh’s concurrence argues that, although 
the test adopted by the majority fails to “establish a bright-line,” the 
vagueness found in the “functional equivalent” test is due to 
“Congress’ statutory text, not the Court’s opinion.”182 In other words, 
blame the text, not the Court. Third, in response to Justice Thomas’s 
dissent,183 the Kavanaugh concurrence reiterates that, under the 
majority opinion, time and distance are usually going to be the most 
important factors.184 This emphasis on time and distance, in his 
view, “will help guide application of the statutory standard going 
forward.”185 
7. Dissents by Justices Thomas and Alito 
Justices Thomas (joined by Justice Gorsuch) and Alito each 
wrote a dissenting opinion. Justice Thomas would have adopted 
essentially the position advocated by Maui County and concluded 
that the text and structure of the Clean Water Act only require 
permits for the direct release of pollutants from a point source to a 
navigable water.186 In his view, it is a mistake for the majority to 
adopt the “functional equivalent” test based on an “open-ended 
inquiry into congressional intent and practical considerations.”187 
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182. Id. 
183. See infra Part III.E.7. 
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Instead, the Court should “adhere to the text.”188 Further, as he 
reads the statute, the definition of a discharge as an “addition” to 
navigable water “from” a point source “indicates that the statute 
excludes anything other than a direct discharge.”189 
Justice Thomas also disagrees with the majority’s claim that 
limiting the statute to direct discharges would create a “massive 
loophole.”190 Instead, he opines that his reading of the statute “is the 
most logical because it is consonant with the scope of Congress’ 
[commerce] power” and “ties the statute more closely to navigable 
waters, on the theory that they are at least a channel of these kinds 
of commerce.”191 In his view, the majority’s multifactor test and list 
of seven factors does little to explain when a permit will be required. 
“[T]he Court does not commit to whether those factors are the only 
relevant ones, whether those factors are always relevant, or which 
factors are the most important.”192 The majority’s list and discussion 
of potentially relevant factors “ultimately does little to explain how 
functionally equivalent an indirect discharge must be to require a 
permit.”193 
Justice Alito wrote a much longer dissent, nearly as long as the 
majority opinion.194 His dissent is quite critical, accusing the 
majority of “mak[ing] up a rule that provides no clear guidance and 
invites arbitrary and inconsistent application.”195 In his view, there 
are only two ways to read the text of the Clean Water Act: either it 
requires permits only for direct discharges, or it requires permits for 
every discharge from a point source that eventually makes its way to 
a navigable water.196 The majority’s attempt to carve a middle road 
with the “functional equivalent” test (a phrase not found in the 
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statute) “is not a plausible interpretation of the statutory text and, 
to make matters worse, . . . has no clear meaning.”197 Although the 
term “may have a quasi-technical ring,” the majority fails to give it 
much substance or to explain “[h]ow similar is sufficiently 
similar.”198 Lamenting the lack of a “real answer,” Justice Alito notes 
that, although the majority states that time and distance are most 
important, “at least five other factors may have a bearing on the 
question, and even this list is not exhaustive.”199 In his view, no one 
is well-served by the new standard. Regulated entities “are left to 
guess how this nebulous standard will be applied”; “[r]egulators are 
given the discretion . . . to make of this standard what they will”; 
“[a]nd the lower courts? The Court’s advice, in essence, is: ‘That’s 
your problem. Muddle through as best you can.’”200 
In Justice Alito’s view, without a clear explanation for the 
“functional equivalent test,” all the majority has done is “adopt[] a 
nebulous standard, enumerate[] a non-exhaustive list of potentially 
relevant factors, and wash[] its hands of the problem.”201 He foresees 
that, in nearly every case, “dischargers will be able to argue that the 
Court’s multifactor test does not require a permit. Opponents will be 
able to make the opposite argument. Regulators will be able to justify 
whatever result they prefer in a particular case. And judges will be 
left at sea.”202 
IV. APPLYING THE “FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENT” 
TEST WITH A “HALLMARKS” APPROACH 
The Court in County of Maui confirmed that (i) all direct point 
source discharges are regulated, but (ii) at least some indirect point 
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source discharges are not regulated, and (iii) the difference between 
(i) and (ii) depends on an undefined “functional equivalence” guided 
by sometimes-at-cross-purposes statutory objectives. So now what? 
It’s time to present, and hopefully convince the reader of the 
propriety of, the hallmarks gloss. First, we explain why we believe 
that such a gloss is necessary. Second, we discuss the four essential 
steps of any functional equivalent analysis and then apply those 
steps (with due regard for the Court’s factors) to the Clean Water Act 
context. Finally, we reformulate the Court’s articulation of the Act’s 
objectives and explain how a modestly limited purpose-based 
analysis can be a helpful check on over-expansive applications of 
County of Maui. 
A. Why is the “hallmarks” gloss necessary? 
One may well begin the analysis by questioning our entire 
endeavor. Is help really needed to implement County of Maui’s 
functional equivalent rule? Doesn’t the majority opinion provide an 
extensive list of factors, and guiding statutory purposes to boot, for 
identifying the functional equivalent of a direct discharge?203 
Perhaps true. Nevertheless, neither the factors nor the purported 
statutory purposes can really lead the analysis all the way to a clear 
determination of what is and what is not a functional equivalent.204 
First, the seven factors themselves do not compel any particular 
result. For example, that one must take time and distance into 
account does not mean that any particular combination of the two 
(outside of the bookends stated in the opinion205) will necessarily 
command an answer.206 As the Court itself conceded in articulating 
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the factors, “[t]he difficulty . . . is that it does not, on its own, clearly 
explain how to deal with middle instances.”207 The Court’s factors 
only clearly answer the extreme cases about which there likely would 
not be disagreement and thus for which a gloss on the functional 
equivalent test would be unnecessary.208 
Second, reliance on statutory purpose is unhelpful because the 
statute’s purposes are in tension. The County of Maui majority 
counseled that “[d]ecisions should not create serious risks either of 
undermining state regulation of groundwater or of creating loopholes 
that undermine the statute’s basic federal regulatory objectives.”209 
Fair enough, but the reality is that one person’s “deference to state 
regulation” can very easily be characterized as another person’s 
“loophole” in federal regulation. Put more broadly, every pollutant 
discharge that escapes federal regulation could be characterized as 
(i) Congress’ decision to defer to state regulatory authority or (ii) an 
undesirable gap in Congress’ comprehensive federal regulation of 
water pollution.210 Statutory objectives simply cannot provide 
guidance when, as defined in County of Maui, they point in opposite 
directions.211 
Something more than factors and purposes is therefore needed 
to direct implementation of the functional equivalent test. 
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B. The hallmark interpretation in practice 
In this section we set forth a four-step method for implementing 
a functional equivalent analysis to determine whether pollutants 
have been discharged “from any point source.” In brief, these steps 
are: 
1) to identify the reference point, i.e., Y in “X is the 
functional equivalent of Y” 
2) to identify the pertinent “functions”—or, in the case of 
County of Maui’s functional equivalent test, the 
“hallmarks” of Y—let’s call this Y1 
3) to identify the functions (or hallmarks) of X, namely X1 
4) to determine whether X1 is the “equivalent” of Y1 
We note at the outset that only some of these steps need to be 
repeated for each application of a functional equivalent test. For 
example, once the reference point (Y) and its pertinent functions (Y1) 
have been identified, those will remain the same for every 
employment of County of Maui’s functional equivalent test. In 
contrast, the non-direct-discharge, its hallmarks, and its possible 
equivalence with the reference point are variables whose content will 
change depending on the facts of any given case. Here, however, 
given that this is the initial run of the hallmark test, we set out below 
an explication of each step in the analysis. 
1. The first step—the reference point Y 
Every functional equivalent test must begin with identifying the 
reference point, that is, the thing to which comparison will be made. 
In County of Maui the Court identified the reference point as a 
“direct discharge.”212 This is not a statutory term, and the Court did 
not define it.213 However, from the Court’s discussion of the term, it 
appears to mean the discharge of pollutants from a point source that 
 
212. County of Maui, 140 S. Ct. at 1468. 
213. See id. at 1485 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“The Clean Water Act, however, says 
nothing about ‘the functional equivalent’ of a direct discharge. That is the Court’s 
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immediately enter a regulated surface water.214 In explaining why 
Maui County’s and the EPA’s tests were too narrow, that is, why a 
functional equivalent test is necessary, the Court began its analysis 
by offering the example of “a pipe that spews pollution directly into 
coastal waters,” for which “a permit is required.”215 The Court then 
went on to state Maui County’s and the EPA’s position that no permit 
would be required if the pollutant had to travel through any amount 
of groundwater—in other words, why the functional equivalent of the 
prior example should not be regulated. Hence, it follows that, in the 
Court’s view, the prior example of the pollutant travelling nearly 
instantaneously from the point source to the regulated water is a 
“direct discharge.” 
This interpretation of direct discharge is supported by how the 
plurality opinion in Rapanos v. United States, discussed in several of 
the County of Maui opinions,216 understood the concept of “indirect 
discharge.”217  According to that theory of liability, a point-source 
discharger can be liable for pollution “that naturally washes 
downstream . . . , even if the pollutants discharged from a point 
source do not emit ‘directly into’ covered waters, but pass ‘through 
conveyances’ in between.”218 In fact, the majority in County of Maui 
cited the Rapanos plurality for this proposition to support its view 
that the statute regulates more than just discharges that proceed 
from a point source “directly” or “immediately” to a regulated 
water.219 Thus, we have good grounds to make a “direct discharge” 
the Y in our functional equivalent template and to interpret a “direct 
discharge” as one that causes pollutants to immediately enter a 
regulated surface water. 
 
214. See id. at 1473 (majority opinion). 
215. Id.  
216. Id. at 1475; id. at 1478 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring); id. at 1482 (Thomas, 
J., dissenting); id. at 1487 & n.5 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
217. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 743–44 (2006) (plurality opinion). 
218. Id. at 743 (emphasis omitted). 





2. The second step—the relevant function Y1 
Because we are attempting to apply a test for functional 
equivalence, we must next identify the functions, i.e., the Y1, of a 
direct discharge Y. But here we encounter a difficulty. The “function” 
of a pollutant discharge, whether direct or indirect, is the same—to 
convey (i.e., to discharge) pollutants from one place to another.220 
The only difference between the two is the manner in which the 
pollutants are transported. In the one case, pollution is nearly 
continuously conveyed to the navigable water by pipes or channels 
or other similarly transport-facilitating structures. In the other, 
pollution is conveyed by gravity or pressure without the help of such 
structures. Hence, a strict application of functional equivalence—
whether the pollutants have moved—would result in the regulation 
of all discharges from point sources, an outcome that County of Maui 
expressly rejected.221 We therefore must look elsewhere for Y1. 
We propose that the content of Y1 can be found by looking to the 
hallmarks of the “from any point source” pollution at the moment it 
reaches regulated waters. Put in the form of a question: does the 
pollution entering a navigable water look like it came from a point 
source? By “look like,” we of course are not simply referring to visible 
characteristics such as color and clarity, but to any relevant 
measurable characteristics—including temperature, flow rate, and 
chemical composition, to name just a few examples. Viewing the 
issue this way allows us to rely on specific statutory guidance, for the 
Act defines “point source” as a discernable, confined, and discrete 
conveyance.222 Hence, the hallmarks of a point-source discharge are 
pollutants that bear the marks of having been in such a conveyance. 
 
220. It is important to recall that “pollutant” and “discharge of a pollutant” are 
statutorily defined terms, and thus a common-sense or layman’s understanding of 
the function of a pollutant discharge, e.g., “getting rid of pollution,” may not be 
helpful for understanding and applying County of Maui’s functional equivalent test. 
For example, one could “get rid” of pollutants by chemically treating them so that 
they are no longer harmful. But given how capaciously the statute defines 
“pollutant,” Jeffrey G. Miller, Plain Meaning, Precedent, and Metaphysics: 
Interpreting the “Pollutant” Element of the Federal Water Pollution Offense, 44 ENV’T 
L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10960, 10961 (2014) (“[I]t is difficult to imagine a substance 
discharged into water that is not included . . . .”), the resulting substance would likely 
still qualify as a pollutant. 
221.	See County of Maui, 140 S. Ct. at 1471. 






A hallmark test is essentially what the Court envisions. As it 
offered, “a pipe [that ends] a few feet from navigable waters and . . . 
emits pollutants that travel those few feet through groundwater (or 
over the beach)” is not a direct discharge but is the functional 
equivalent of one.223 That is so because such pollutants will likely 
function in the receiving water in the same way as pollutants that 
come immediately from a point source.224 
This focus on pollutants’ hallmarks also melds well with the 
Court’s list of seven factors. For example, time and distance would 
naturally, as the Court states, be the most important factors in a 
typical hallmark analysis,225 as those are the two factors that would 
bear most upon whether a discharge retains its discernable, 
confined, and discrete aspects. Just imagine a hose with water 
coming out of it. Put that hose directly over a stream, and the flow of 
water when hitting the stream is going to be confined. Now, place 
that same hose attached to a sprinkler on a front lawn a hundred 
yards away. Although much of that water will still reach the stream, 
the flow will be much less confined and may well contain ambient 
material not to be found in the direct discharge. 
 
223. County of Maui, 140 S. Ct. at 1476. Another example that suggests the 
Court is thinking in terms of hallmarks comes from a question posed by the Chief 
Justice during oral argument. Transcript of Oral Argument at 7, County of Maui, 
140 S. Ct. 1462 (2020) (No. 18-260) (“CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: So, if you have a 
point source under pressure that . . . doesn’t seep up, [but] shoots the pollutants out, 
and [with] that motion [the pollutant] gets to the jurisdictional water, would that be 
covered? . . . I’m envisioning two different things, one where . . . the pollutant is put 
in the groundwater and then gradually . . . seeps into the . . . ocean, and one where 
it’s . . . forcefully expelled, although it goes through the groundwater.”). 
224.	To be sure, the categories of pollutants’ effects might remain the same 
regardless of the manner of those pollutants’ conveyance. For example, a pound of 
arsenic would harm a stream’s ecosystem to some degree whether or not it ever 
traveled through a point source. But toxicity is largely a function of dose; the greater 
the concentration, the greater the harm. Joseph V. Rodricks, Evaluating Disease 
Causation in Humans Exposed to Toxic Substances, 14 J. L. & POL’Y 39, 45–46 (2006). 
Hence, to the extent that pollutants retain the hallmarks of having been conveyed 
through a discrete and confined structure, one should expect their effects to approach 
those of pollutants emanating directly from such a structure, as opposed to 
pollutants that never did so. 





The foregoing hose example focuses on the concentration 
hallmark of point-source discharges, but there are of course other 
hallmarks that can be useful. Take, for example, the hallmark of 
speedy delivery. To be sure, the speed of conveyance of the pollutants 
is not expressly mentioned in the statutory definition of point source, 
but we think that it is fairly implied. In general, a pollutant 
discharged through a confined and discrete conveyance is likely to 
travel more quickly than one through an unconfined and indiscrete 
conveyance. That point is demonstrated by the following 
hypothetical. Imagine a pipe that discharges into a large (not 
jurisdictional) wetland, which itself ultimately drains to a regulated 
surface water. The wetland operates as a conveyance of the pipe’s 
pollutants, but certainly not as a confined and discrete transporter. 
Rather, the open, broad marsh with innumerable rivulets that we 
envisage is much more like the unconfined and indiscrete conveyance 
which produces nonpoint-source pollution. Such a natural network 
of capillaries will undoubtedly result in a slowing of the transport of 
pollutants, at least in comparison to a pipe running through the 
wetland directly to the regulated surface water. This extended 
transport time, another relevant hallmark, would counsel against 
federal regulation of the original point-source discharge through the 
NPDES permitting program.226 
The hallmarks approach can also be used just as effectively from 
the opposite perspective of nonpoint-source pollution. By implied 
necessity, the statute’s express limitation to pollutants “from any 
point source” means that pollution coming from any nonpoint source 
is not federally regulated.227 Thus, rather than asking whether the 
pollutant discharge looks like a direct discharge from a point source, 
one may instead address the problem of functional equivalence from 
the perspective of whether the pollutant discharge looks like it came 
from a nonpoint source. If the pollution in question bears the 
hallmarks of nonpoint-source pollution, then necessarily it no longer 
 
226.	 As we explain below, infra Part IV.B.5., the discharge could still be 
regulated, if necessary, to vindicate the statutory purpose of loophole minimization—
for example, if the pipe could just as easily be situated to discharge directly into the 
surface water as opposed to through the wetland. 
227. As discussed supra Part II.C, the Act generally prohibits the unpermitted 
“discharge of any pollutant,” 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a), which is defined as “any addition 






bears (if it ever did) any sign that it came from a point source. To be 
sure, the Court in County of Maui framed the issue as when liability 
for a point-source discharge should cease.228 But it didn’t deny the 
related principle that direct regulation of nonpoint-source 
pollution—most of which is ultimately traceable to point sources 
anyway229—is left to the states.230 
What, then, are the hallmarks of nonpoint-source pollution? As 
noted above,231 although the Clean Water Act refers to such 
pollution, the Act does not define it.232 Typically, however, the term 
is used to denote, as the EPA has explained, “pollution generally 
result[ing] from land runoff, precipitation, atmospheric deposition, 
drainage, seepage or hydrologic modification.”233 It therefore follows 
that the hallmarks of nonpoint-source pollution are the flip side of 
point-source pollution, viz., a hard-to-discern and unconfined 
addition of pollutants, such as sheet flow of stormwater over a 
 
228. See County of Maui, 140 S. Ct. at 1470. 
229. See id. (noting that “the power of modern science” to trace pollutants “may 
well allow EPA to assert permitting authority over the release of pollutants that 
reach navigable waters many years after their release . . . and in highly diluted 
forms”); Jeffrey G. Miller, Plain Meaning, Precedent, and Metaphysics: Interpreting 
the “Point Source” Element of the Clean Water Act Offense, 45 ENV’T L. REP. NEWS & 
ANALYSIS 11129, 11147–48 (2015). 
230.	 County of Maui, 140 S. Ct. at 1471 (“[P]erhaps most important, the 
structure of the statute indicates that, as to groundwater pollution and nonpoint 
source pollution, Congress intended to leave substantial responsibility and 
autonomy to the States.”). 
231. See supra Part II.C. 
232.	See 33 U.S.C. § 1288(b)(2)(F)(i), (j)(1); id. § 1329(k). 





field234 (although of course nonpoint-source pollution can become 
point-source pollution before it reaches a surface water235). 
Either way—point source or nonpoint source—the content of Y1 
should be supplied by an analysis, using the Court’s seven factors, of 
the hallmarks of the discharge in question, focusing on the degree to 
which the pollution bears traces of having been emitted from a 
discernable, confined, and discrete conveyance. The attention, 
however, should remain on the hallmarks, not on the factors used to 
identify those hallmarks. Thus, if the discharge’s hallmarks are 
made plain using time and distance, there is no need to analyze, for 
example, the nature of the material through or over which the 
pollutants traveled. 
3. The third step—the function (X1) of the candidate 
functional equivalent (X) 
We now move to the third step of the functional equivalent 
analysis: identifying the hallmarks of the pollution at issue. As with 
the prior step, here too the Court’s seven factors are helpful, but 
ultimately the focus is on the pollution as it arrives at the regulated 
surface water. Naturally, the analysis at this step will be much less 
 
234. Although one may speak of the hallmarks of nonpoint-source pollution, it 
doesn’t make much sense to talk about its functions. “Function” as we use the term 
in this article implies intelligent agency. (We assume that a natural feature could 
not qualify as a point source. See United States v. Plaza Health Labs., Inc., 3 F.3d 
643, 647 (2d Cir. 1993) (“[T]he term ‘point source’ is comprehensible only if it is held 
to the context of industrial and municipal discharges.”); accord Or. Nat. Desert Ass’n 
v. Dombeck, 172 F.3d 1092, 1099 (9th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he term ‘point source’ does not 
include a human being, or any other animal.”); cf. Sierra Club v. Abston Constr. Co., 
Inc., 620 F.2d 41, 45 (5th Cir. 1980) (“Conveyances of pollution formed either as a 
result of natural erosion or by material means, and which constitute a component of 
a mine drainage system, may fit the statutory definition and thereby subject the 
operators to liability under the Act.”)). Because nonpoint-source pollution is pollution 
the transport of which to regulated waters is largely due to the natural forces of the 
hydrological cycle—that is, accomplished by and large in the absence of human 
agency—it does not in the sense of this article have a “function.” 
235. Nw. Env’t Def. Ctr. v. Brown, 640 F.3d 1063, 1071 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[R]unoff 
is not inherently a nonpoint or point source of pollution. Rather, it is a nonpoint or 
point source . . . depending on whether it is allowed to run off naturally (and is thus 
a nonpoint source) or is collected, channeled, and discharged through a system of 
ditches, culverts, channels, and similar conveyances (and is thus a point source 







theoretical than in prior steps because one will be analyzing an 
actual discharge. Hence, one can expect that data collection and 
expert analysis will be prominent. 
4. The fourth step—does X1 = Y1? 
The fourth step of the analysis is the critical one: are the 
hallmarks of the pollution at issue the “equivalent” of the hallmarks 
of directly discharged pollution? The most significant part of this step 
is of course figuring out what “equivalent” means. With respect to 
undefined statutory text, an interpreter is supposed to look to 
ordinary language,236 and that usually means reference to the 
dictionary.237 In fact, that is what Justice Alito did in his dissenting 
opinion when he tried to further define the meaning of point 
source.238 There doesn’t seem to be any reason why this canon of 
interpretation should not apply to judicial opinions. Not surprisingly, 
a variety of dictionaries define “equivalent” to mean something that 
is equal in value, measure, or other quality.239 
Besides dictionary definitions, case law can be helpful in 
figuring out the Court’s understanding of “equivalent,” especially by 
looking at how rules like the Court’s “functional equivalent of a direct 
discharge” standard have been employed in similar contexts. In 
Crown Simpson Pulp Co. v. Costle, the Court held that the Clean 
Water Act’s provision for direct review in the courts of appeals of 
certain types of EPA actions extends to an EPA veto of a state-issued 
Clean Water Act permit.240 The Court reasoned that such an action 
is “functionally similar” to an EPA action “denying any permit,” for 
 
236. E.g., New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 139 S. Ct. 532, 539 (2019). 
237. E.g., Taniguchi v. Kan Pacific Saipan, Ltd., 566 U.S. 560, 569 (2012). 
238.	County of Maui v. Haw. Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct. 1462, 1488 (2020) (Alito, 
J., dissenting). 
239. E.g., Equivalent, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INT’L DICTIONARY 769 (1993); 
Equivalent, Dictionary.com, https://www.dictionary.com/browse/equivalent?s=t 
[https://perma.cc/VY7C-Z5PZ]; Equivalent, Merriam-Webseter.com, 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/equivalent [https://perma.cc/FK5E-
YCXE]. 





which direct review is expressly provided.241 The Court explained 
that “the precise effect” of either EPA action is the denial of a permit, 
and treating the two differently would produce “a seemingly 
irrational bifurcated system” of permit review, one that the Court 
would not impute to Congress absent a clearer expression of 
legislative intent.242 
Another Clean Water Act example is the Ninth Circuit’s decision 
in Environmental Defense Center v. EPA,243 which the Second 
Circuit followed in Waterkeeper Alliance v. EPA.244 The question in 
these cases was whether a notice of intent to proceed under a general 
Clean Water Act permit is ever subject to the requirements that 
govern the processing of permits themselves.245 Both courts held in 
the affirmative, ruling that the Act’s notice and comment 
requirements apply whenever the notice of intent operates as the 
“functional equivalent” of the latter; that is, when the notice “crosses 
the threshold from being an item of procedural correspondence to 
being a substantive component of a regulatory regime.”246 
These decisions employing “functionally similar” and 
“functionally equivalent” standards support a plain-meaning 
understanding of the equivalence component of County of Maui’s 
“functional equivalent of a direct discharge” test. The cases look to 
the effect of the action and then determine whether a rule governing 
another action with the same (or very similar) effect should apply to 
both actions. That is basically the same analysis that we propose 
here for ascertaining County of Maui’s functional equivalent. The 
focus should not be on function per se but rather on comparing the 
 
241. Id. at 196 (construing 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1)(F)). 
242. Id. at 196–97. 
243. Env’t Def. Ctr. v. EPA, 344 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 2003). 
244.	Waterkeeper All. v. EPA, 399 F.3d 486 (2d Cir. 2005). 
245. “Under the traditional general permitting model, each general permit 
identifies the output limitations and technology-based requirements necessary to 
adequately protect water quality from a class of dischargers. Those dischargers may 
then acquire permission to discharge under the Clean Water Act by filing [notices of 
intent], which embody each discharger’s agreement to abide by the terms of the 
general permit.” Env’t Def. Ctr., 344 F.3d at 853. The most significant of these are 
the obligations to provide the public a copy of the proposed permit as well as a 
hearing on the same. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(j), (a)(1). 






effects of the discharges, a comparison based on the extent to which 
the pollution bears the marks of having come from a point source. 
In summary—the ordinary meaning of equivalent is “the same” 
(or, in our article’s semiotics, “=”), and in the context of County of 
Maui’s functional equivalent test, as well as analogous Clean Water 
Act case law, “equivalent” means that the discharged pollution has 
the same effect, or bears the same hallmarks, that one would expect 
to see from a direct point-source discharge. 
5. Step five—a statutory purpose and federalism 
check 
We’ve now run through the essential steps of a functional 
equivalent analysis. We have shown how to identify the reference 
point of “direct discharge” (Y), its function-hallmarks (Y1), the 
function-hallmarks (X1) of the discharge under investigation (X), and 
the required relationship between X1 and Y1 (the same or “=” in 
hallmarks or effects). Shouldn’t that be the end of the story? 
Arguably yes, but the County of Maui majority made clear that 
its functional equivalent test also has to take into account the 
statutory purposes, and actually, more than that. The majority 
suggests that something that might otherwise look like the 
functional equivalent of a direct discharge is not such if its regulation 
(or presumably the regulation of the class of discharges of which it is 
a part) would result in a significant federal intrusion into traditional 
state areas of regulation, such as groundwater.247 Similarly, the 
majority suggests that something that might otherwise not look like 
a direct discharge may still be regulated if a decision not to regulate 
would create big loopholes in the Clean Water Act.248 
 
247.	County of Maui v. Haw. Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct. 1462, 1476 (2020) 
(referring to “Congress’ basic aim” to regulate “without undermining the States’ 
longstanding regulatory authority over land and groundwater”); id. (highlighting 
“the need, reflected in the statute, to preserve state regulation of groundwater and 
other nonpoint sources of pollution”); id. at 1477 (“Decisions should not create serious 
risks . . . of undermining state regulation of groundwater . . . .”). 





Now, as we have already noted, County of Maui’s nod to purpose 
is even more fraught with interpretive danger than the usual 
purposivist excursus entails because the identified statutory 
objectives—deferring to state regulation and ensuring ample federal 
regulation—are frequently at cross-purposes. Even so, perhaps some 
meaningful direction can be squeezed out of the Court-identified 
statutory objectives. The purpose of deferring to state regulation 
seems clear enough. As for avoiding federal loopholes, perhaps what 
the Court meant was not so much a federal-state regulatory toggle 
but rather avoiding instances where a rule will lead existing direct-
point-source dischargers to reconfigure the same discharge so as to 
avoid liability.249 Thus, this statutory purpose isn’t necessarily 
violated simply because regulation of a given discharge is now left to 
the states—that would re-present the cross-purposes problem. 
Instead, the statutory purpose is violated only if the discharger, in 
light of the rule articulated, would choose to do the same thing a 
different way rather than either keep doing the same thing or cease 
discharging altogether. 
A good example is septic tanks, the regulation of which both the 
majority and the Alito dissent were concerned about.250 Regulating 
septic tank discharges to groundwater under the NPDES permitting 
program would be a huge expansion of federal control. That would 
violate the first statutory objective. But what about the second 
objective? Septic tanks are not designed to discharge directly to 
surface water, and we suspect that few, if any, septic tanks do in fact 
so discharge. Rather, septic tanks are designed to, and in fact do, 
discharge directly into groundwater.251 Altering that fact would 
require a major overhaul of the purpose, design, and function of 
septic tanks—and is exceedingly unlikely to happen. Hence, 
deferring to the states to regulate septic tank discharges conforms to 
both of the statutory objectives identified by County of Maui: it 
preserves traditional state authority over groundwater while 
 
249. Id. at 1473. 
250. Id. at 1477, 1489. 
251. Interpretive Statement on Application of the Clean Water Act NPDES 
Program to Releases of Pollutants from a Point Source to Groundwater, 84 Fed. Reg. 






avoiding the encouragement of law evasion through the 
reconfiguring of direct discharges. 
Another example, with perhaps a less clear outcome, is bottom 
ash from coal-fired power plants. A byproduct of the plants’ heat-
generation, bottom ash is typically disposed of by being mixed with 
water and piped to settling ponds. Unfortunately, the ponds’ contents 
can seep into the underlying groundwater, which can convey the 
pollutants to surface waters.252 Should such pollution be federally 
regulated under the NPDES program? Setting aside the County of 
Maui factors and just looking at the statutory purposes, it is not clear 
whether the answer should be pro-federal-regulation or contra. If the 
focus is groundwater pollution, then the federalism purpose should 
weigh against regulation. If the question is instead minimizing the 
environmental harm of the byproducts of electricity generation, then 
perhaps the federalism concern is not as pronounced. But, what may 
be decisive is that the loophole purpose does not appear to support 
regulation at all. Just like septic tanks, settling ponds are not 
designed to discharge to surface waters (ideally, they shouldn’t 
discharge at all). Nor is that a design change that has any likelihood 
of being made. Moreover, groundwater discharges from coal ash 
settling ponds are already regulated under the federal Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act,253 so concerns about law evasion 
should be minimal. 
Ultimately, we expect that the Court’s purpose-based approach 
for applying a functional equivalence test will operate like the 
“logical stopping point” test employed in Commerce Clause cases.254 
 
252. See, e.g., Ky. Waterways All. v. Ky. Utils. Co., 905 F.3d 925, 930–31 (6th 
Cir. 2018). 
253. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (regulating groundwater discharges from coal 
ash settling ponds under Coal Combustion Residuals Rule, 40 C.F.R. pt. 257 (2020)). 
254. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995) (“To uphold the 
Government’s contentions here, we would have to pile inference upon inference in a 
manner that would bid fair to convert congressional authority under the Commerce 
Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the States.”). The parallel to 
the Commerce Clause cases is especially strong given that County of Maui’s purpose 
“check” presumably operates on categories of discharges, as opposed to individual 
discharges (the regulation of which would likely never pose a federalism or loophole 





That test is intended to preserve the Constitution’s federal structure. 
That is, the test is not really a stand-alone rule—the analysis does 
not necessarily turn on purpose (or on logical stopping points)—but 
rather is something like a quality control measure, or guardrail, to 
provide and maintain perspective. In other words, even if a given 
discharge would appear to be the functional equivalent of a direct 
discharge, a court should not impose liability if federal regulation of 
the class of such discharges would upset the Act’s federal-state 
balance. On the other hand, a court may well be justified in imposing 
liability if not doing so would incentivize law evasion through the 
reconfiguring of otherwise regulated direct discharges. 
One final point. In our experience, the reason why a court would 
employ a functional equivalent test is to capture activity that would 
not be regulated under a strict reading of pertinent legal text. In 
other words, courts seek out functional equivalents because they 
want to expand an existing rule to cover something else, i.e., to 
explain why Xs should be subject to Y rules. For example, in Crown 
Simpson, a strict reading of the Clean Water Act’s direct judicial 
review provision would have meant that the EPA’s vetoes are not 
subject to that provision because technically they are not permit 
denials. However, since the Court found that result to be “irrational,” 
it adopted a functional equivalent test to effectively expand the text’s 
scope.255 Yet, in County of Maui, a strict reading of the text arguably 
would have supported the respondents because the discharges in 
question were indeed “from any point source.”256 The Court, we think 
correctly, rejected that strict approach, yet it did so in favor of 
functional equivalence. That, as noted above, is not a concept 
normally employed to narrow a rule. We note this peculiarity here 
simply to underscore how courts should not be led unwittingly to 
adopt broad applications of the Act based on the inherent scope-
 
establishes Congress’ power to regulate purely local activities that are part of an 
economic ‘class of activities’ that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.”). 
	 255. Although there are certainly circumstances where one could imagine no 
court seriously indulging a functional equivalent test—for example, allowing a 34-
year-old to serve as president, on the ground that the person has the physical, 
emotional, and intellectual resources of and therefore is the functional equivalent of 
a 35-year-old. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. 






expanding dynamic of a functional equivalent test, especially in light 
of the particular context in which County of Maui adopted it. 
V. CONCLUSION 
When does the Clean Water Act regulate point-source 
discharges? From the text, one might well conclude that it regulates 
all such discharges.257 But not even the Ninth Circuit (or for that 
matter the respondents in County of Maui258) was willing to go that 
far.259 Hence, to best understand County of Maui one must address 
the interpretive question from the perspective of seeking a narrowing 
construction. The question is, just how narrow? The majority says 
narrow enough such that one regulates only “direct discharges” and 
their “functional equivalent.”260 That answer, as “a nebulous 
standard” guided by “a non-exhaustive list of potentially relevant 
factors,” is not quite satisfying.261 
Thus, to avoid forcing “regulated parties to ‘feel their way on a 
case-by-case basis,’”262 we have presented the hallmark gloss on 
County of Maui as a way to determine whether an “indirect” 
pollutant discharge is nevertheless the functional equivalent of a 
direct discharge. According to that test, if the pollutants bear the 
hallmarks of having been emitted from a point source—that is, if the 
pollutants reflect having been conveyed through a discernible, 
confined, and discrete conveyance—then their discharge is the 
 
257. See id. at 1471 (“[T]o interpret the word ‘from’ in this literal way would 
require a permit in surprising, even bizarre, circumstances, such as for pollutants 
carried to navigable waters on a bird's feathers, or, to mention more mundane 
instances, the 100-year migration of pollutants through 250 miles of groundwater to 
a river.”). 
258. Id. at 1470 (“The respondents suggest that the standard can be narrowed 
by adding a ‘proximate cause’ requirement.”). 
259. See Haw. Wildlife Fund v. County of Maui, 886 F.3d 737, 749 (9th Cir. 2018) 
(“We therefore disagree with the district court that ‘liability under the Clean Water 
Act is triggered when pollutants reach navigable water, regardless of how they get 
there.’”) (emphasis omitted). 
260.	County of Maui, 140 S. Ct. at 1476. 
261.	Id. at 1491 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
262. Id. at 1491-92 (quoting Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 758 (2006) 





functional equivalent of a direct discharge. In contrast, if the 
pollutants do not still bear those hallmarks, but rather are 
indistinguishable from pollutants added by nonpoint sources, then 
their discharge is not a functional equivalent. 
In employing this analysis, the Court’s factors certainly have a 
role to play.263 Also relevant are the Court-identified statutory 
purposes.264 But the most important consideration is to keep the 
analysis focused on the nature of pollution when it reaches the 
regulated surface water and not to become engrossed in measuring 
or qualifying the path that the pollution took to reach the regulated 
water. In contrast to an unelaborated County of Maui analysis, our 
gloss on the functional equivalent test will provide needed guidance 
to the lower courts, the EPA, and—most importantly—individual 
citizens still feeling their way through the Clean Water Act’s not yet 
fully elucidated commands. 
 
 
263. Id. at 1476–77 (majority opinion).  
264. Id. at 1477. 
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